We analyze the effects of transfer taxation on stable outcomes in matching markets. Taxes can make inefficient outcomes stable by causing workers to prefer firms from which they receive high idiosyncratic match utility, but to which they are not wellsuited. We show that under proportional taxation, efficiency can be non-monotonic in the tax rate. However, in wage markets -where agents on one side of the market (workers) refuse to match without a positive transfer (wage) -efficiency is strictly decreasing in the tax rate. We find analogous results for flat taxation. In addition to highlighting a cost of taxation that does not appear to have been examined previously, our model provides a continuous link between the canonical models of matching with and without transfers.
Introduction
We study the distortionary effects of income taxation on the stable outcomes in markets with individual-specific match utilities. Taxation causes workers to prefer firms from which they receive high idiosyncratic match utility, but to which they are not well-suited. This can reduce market efficiency by changing the set of matchings that are stable in the sense that no agent wants to deviate. The matching distortion we identify differs from the well known effects of taxation on intensive (e.g., Blundell et al. (1998) ; Saez (2004) ) and extensive (e.g., Meyer (2002) ; Saez (2002) ) labor supply; it affects the allocation of workers to firms without necessarily changing provision of labor. This matching distortion arises even in markets with frictionless matching, and thus differs from the well known effects of search costs on matching efficiency (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) ; Boone and Bovenberg (2002) ) and of taxation on search behavior (e.g., Gentry and Hubbard (2004) ; Holzner and Launov (2012) ).
We analyze a model of matching with transfers. Agents have heterogeneous rankings of potential match partners. Transfers may be "taxed," causing some of each transfer payment to be taken from the agents.
1 For example, in the case of a proportional tax τ , an agent receives fraction (1 − τ ) of the amount her partner gives up (see Section 3). Taxation lowers the value of transfers, causing agents to prefer match partners that provide higher individualspecific match utility over those offering higher transfers; this distorts away from efficient matching.
As in standard taxation models, full efficiency is achieved as the level of taxation approaches 0. Moreover, unlike in most other models of taxation, for any given matching market there is some strictly positive tax threshold below which full efficiency is always obtained. Unfortunately, however, in general markets lowering the tax does not always increase efficiency: A fully efficient match may be stable in the presence of a high tax, but unstable in the presence of a lower tax, and stable again in the presence of an even lower tax.
While the impact of taxation on matching efficiency can be non-monotonic in general, monotonicity does obtain in a class of markets particularly important for economic analysis: markets in which agents on one side of the market ("workers") refuse to match without positive transfers ("wages") from their match partners ("managers"). In these wage markets, reducing taxation always improves the efficiency of stable matchings.
Although our results are presented in the language of labor markets, they also have implications for understanding marriage markets. Taxation can be reinterpreted as representing frictions in the (often non-monetary) transfers that occur between partners. For example, it may be the case that the utility a woman gives up by washing the dishes is greater than the utility her partner receives from her doing so.
2 Our non-monotonicity results indicate that it is hard to predict the effect of a reduction in intrahousehold transfer frictions on matching efficiency.
Of the vast literature on taxation, our work is most closely related to the research on the effect of taxation on workers' occupational choices (e.g., Parker (2003) ; Sheshinski (2003) ; Powell and Shan (2012) ; Lockwood et al. (2012) ); however, this prior work only reflects part of the matching distortion because it does not model the two-sidedness of the market. If workers and firms both have heterogeneous preferences over match partners, then matching distortions can reduce productivity even without any aggregate shift in workers from one firm (or industry) to another.
Our approach is also related to the literature on taxation in Roy models. The utility that a manager or firm in our model gets from a worker could be thought of the productivity of the worker in that firm or sector. However, Roy models generally assume that an agent's pretax wage in a sector is unchanged when the tax changes, while we allow the surplus sharing between firms and individuals to adjust when the tax changes (Rothschild and Scheuer (2012) ; Boadway et al. (1991) ). While some Roy models allow the productivity of individuals to be affected by other workers in the industry, it is also reasonable to think that when taxes cause an industry's labor supply to increase, firms may offer workers a smaller share of their outputs as wages.
Our work also introduces a new link between the literatures on matching with and without transfers: Absent taxation, our framework is equivalent to matching with perfect transfers (e.g., Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) ; Shapley and Shubik (1971); Becker (1974) ); under maximal taxation, it corresponds to the standard model of matching without transfers (e.g., Gale and Shapley (1962); Roth (1982) ). Thus, the intermediate tax levels we consider introduce a continuum of models between the two existing extremes. While prior work has analyzed frameworks that can embed our intermediate transfer models (Crawford and Knoer (1981) ; Kelso and Crawford (1982) ; Quinzii (1984) ), it has focused on the structure of the set of stable outcomes within a fixed transfer model. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to show how the efficiency of stable outcomes changes across intermediate transfer models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our general model. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the cases of proportional and flat taxation, respectively. Section 5 discusses further connections to the literature and concludes.
General Model
We study a two-sided, many-to-one matching market with fully heterogeneous preferences. We refer to agents on one side of the market as managers, denoted m ∈ M ; we call agents on the other side workers, denoted w ∈ W . Our notation and language are also consistent with modeling marriage markets, in which case M can be taken to be the set of men and W can be taken to be the set of women. Consequently, and also to simplify our exposition, we use male-gendered pronouns when referring to managers m ∈ M and female-gendered pronouns when referring to workers w ∈ W (without intending any statement concerning gender roles in reality).
Before introducing our models of taxation, we describe our underlying matching framework.
Each agent i ∈ M ∪ W derives utility from being matched to agents on the other side of the market. We denote these match utilities by α Note that it is possible for workers to disagree about the relative desirabilities of potential managers and for managers to disagree about the relative values of potential workers. We impose no structure on worker match utilities and only enough structure on manager preferences to ensure the existence of equilibria (as we discuss later in this section). Specifically, we assume that managers' preferences satisfy the standard Kelso and Crawford (1982) /Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) substitutability condition: the availability of new workers cannot make a manager want to hire a worker he would otherwise reject.
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A matching µ is an assignment of agents such that each manager is either matched to himself (unmatched ) or matched to a set of workers who are also matched to him. Denoting the power set of W by ℘(W ), a matching is then a mapping µ such that
with w ∈ µ(m) if and only if µ(w) = m. The total match utility of µ is
We say that a matchingμ is efficient if it maximizes total match utility (among all possible matchings), i.e. if M(μ) ≥ M(µ) for all matchings µ. We allow for the possibility of (at least partial) transfers between matched agents. We denote the transfer from m to w by t m→w ; if m receives a (positive) transfer from w, then t m→w < 0. A transfer vector t identifies (prospective) transfers between all manager-worker pairs, not just between those pairs that are matched. We also include in the vector t "transfers" t i→i for all agents i ∈ M ∪ W , with the understanding that t i→i = 0. For notational convenience, we denote by t m→Y the total transfer from manager m to workers in Y :
With these conventions, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given matching µ, the sum of transfers managers pay to their match partners equals the sum of the transfers paid by workers' match partners,
In the presence of taxation, a worker might not receive an amount equal to that which her match partner gives up; in general, a (weakly increasing) transfer function ξ(·) converts managers' transfer payments into the amounts that workers receive, post-tax. For all our transfer functions, we use the convention that ξ(t w→w ) = 0 for all w ∈ W . Note that if ξ(t m→w ) = t m→w , then (1) will generally not be equal to the sum of the amounts that the workers receive.
An arrangement [µ; t] consists of a matching and transfer vector. 5 We assume that agent utility is quasi-linear in transfers and that there are no externalities. With these assumptions, the utilities of arrangement [µ; t] for manager m ∈ M and worker w ∈ W are
Note that the utility of a worker w ∈ W depends on the transfer function ξ(·). Our analysis focuses on the arrangements that are stable, in the sense that no agent wants to deviate.
Definition. An arrangement [µ; t] is stable given transfer function ξ(·) if the following conditions hold:
1. Each agent (weakly) prefers his or her assigned match partner(s) (with the corresponding transfer(s)) to being unmatched, that is,
2. Each manager (weakly) prefers his assigned match partners (with the corresponding transfers) to any alternative set of workers (with the corresponding transfers), that is,
and each worker (weakly) prefers her assigned match partner (with the corresponding transfer) to any alternative manager (with the corresponding transfer), that is,
A matching µ is stable given transfer function ξ(·) if there is some transfer vector t such that the arrangement [µ; t] is stable given ξ(·); in this case t is said to support µ (given ξ(·)). Arguments of Kelso and Crawford (1982) show that the stability concept we use is equivalent to the other standard stability concept of matching theory, which rules out the possibility of "blocks" in which groups of agents jointly deviate from the stable outcome (potentially adjusting transfers).
6 The assumption of substitutable preferences ensures that at least one stable arrangement always exists. 5 Here were use the term "arrangement" instead of "outcome" for consistency with the matching literature (e.g., Hatfield et al. (2012) ), which uses the latter term when the transfer vector only includes transfers between agents who are matched to each other.
6 Our stability concept is defined in terms of arrangements; the block-based definition is defined only in terms of a matching and the transfers between matched partners. Kelso and Crawford (1982) used the term competitive equilibrium for the former concept and used the core to refer to the latter.
7 Results of Kelso and Crawford (1982) guarantee the existence of a stable arrangement in our framework. Details are provided in the Appendix.
Some of our analysis focuses on markets in which workers have nonpositive valuations for matching, so that they will only match if paid positive "wage" transfers. Formally, we say that a market is a wage market if
for all w ∈ W and m ∈ M ; it is a strictly positive wage market if the inequality in (2) is strict for all w ∈ W and m ∈ M .
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For simplicity, our examples are set in one-to-one matching markets, in which each manager matches to at most one worker. For such markets, we abuse notation slightly by only specifying match utilities for manager-worker pairs and writing w in place of the set {w} (e.g., α m {w} is denoted α m w ).
Proportional Taxation
First we analyze proportional (linear) taxation systems, of the type used in some US states and dozens of countries around the world. These taxes take the form of a fixed percentage deduction of each agent's income. Formally, under proportional tax τ , if an agent pays p, then his or her partner receives (1 − τ )p. The associated transfer function ξ 
If an arrangement [µ; t] or matching µ is stable given ξ prop τ (·), then we say it is stable under tax τ . We analyze how the set of stable matchings changes as τ decreases from 1 to 0.
The case τ = 1 corresponds to the standard Gale and Shapley (1962) setting in which transfers are not allowed, 9 so that inefficient matchings can be stable. When τ = 0, by contrast, only efficient matchings are stable (see, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1971) ; Hatfield et al. (2012) ). Given this, one might expect that as the tax level τ decreases, the match utilities of stable matchings should always (weakly) increase. Unfortunately, a simple example shows that this is not true in general. , γ w1 m1 (1 0 1 , 9 9 )
Possible Inefficiencies of Tax-Reduction in General Markets
Example 1. Consider a one-to-one market with one manager, M = {m 1 }, two workers, W = {w 1 , w 2 }, and match utilities as pictured in Figure 2a . Worker w 1 receives high utility from matching with m 1 . Manager m 1 is indifferent towards worker w 1 and receives moderate utility from matching with w 2 . Worker w 2 has a mild preference for being unmatched, rather than matching with m 1 . As illustrated in Figure 2b , when τ = 1 (or when transfers are not allowed), the only stable matchingμ hasμ(m 1 ) = w 1 . This happens to be the efficient matching; therefore, it is also stable when τ = 0, as shown in Figure 2c . This matching yields total match utility M(μ) = 200. Figure 2d shows that for τ = .8, an inefficient matchingμ, for whichμ(m 1 ) = w 2 , is stable. This matching generates a total match utility M(μ) = 92. Even if w 1 transfers 200-her maximal utility of matching-to m 1 , there is a transfer m 1 can offer to w 2 that is sufficient to attract w 2 , while still providing m 1 more utility than he would obtain from matching with w 1 (and receiving (1 − .8)(200) = 40).
Not only is an inefficient matching stable under tax τ = .8, but the efficient matchinĝ µ is not stable at this tax level. Indeed, the efficient matchingμ is unstable under any tax τ ∈ (.6, .9). For that range, (100 − 200(1 − τ ))(1 − τ ) − 8 > 0, so that the maximum m 1 can transfer to w 2 while still preferring her to w 1 is sufficient to outweigh the disutility w 2 gets from matching to m 1 .
Although Example 1 shows that total match utility of stable matchings may decrease when the tax rate falls, an arrangement stable under a higher tax rate can never Pareto dominate an arrangement that is stable under a lower tax rate. 
Efficiency of Tax-Reduction in Wage Markets
Example 1 shows that, in general markets, decreasing the tax rate on transfers may decrease the total match utility of stable matchings. Our next result shows, however, that this cannot happen in wage markets. Thus, in labor markets where firms always pay workers, decreasing the tax rate always makes (weakly) more efficient matchings stable.
In wage markets, payments flow from managers to workers; hence, any stable matching can be supported by a non-negative transfer vector.
11 Thus, the transfer function ξ prop τ (·) takes the simpler form
10 To see this, we first note that under taxτ = 1, an arrangement with transfers of 0 among match partners Pareto dominates any other arrangement associated to the same matching. Thus, the transfers between match partners under [μ;t] can be asumed to be 0. Then, the comparison between [μ;t] (under taxτ = 1) to [μ;t] (under taxτ ) amounts to a comparison of agents' match utilities underμ to their total utilities under [μ;t].
11 There may be a supporting transfer vector where some off-path transfers are negative, but in that case there is always another supporting transfer vector that replaces those negative transfers with 0s. Our results only require the existence of a non-negative supporting transfer vector.
As all positive transfers are paid from managers to workers, there cannot be a scenario in which, when the tax is reduced, a manager m 1 can transfer enough to get a worker w 2 he prefers, but when the tax falls more, a different worker w 1 can "buy m 1 back." Thus, situations as in Example 1 cannot arise. Our next result shows that this intuition extends to wage markets more generally.
Theorem 1. In a wage market with proportional taxation, a decrease in taxation (weakly) increases the total match utility of stable matchings. That is, if in a wage market, matching µ is stable under taxτ , matchingμ is stable under taxτ , andτ <τ , then
To prove Theorem 1, we lett ≥ 0 andt ≥ 0 be transfer vectors supportingμ andμ respectively. The stability of [μ;t] implies that
Summing (3) and (4) across agents and regrouping terms, we find:
Intuitively, if we had m∈M t m→μ(m) −t m→μ(m) < 0, then lowering the tax fromτ toτ would increase workers' relative preference forμ overμ, as the tax change has a larger effect on large transfers. Sinceμ is stable under the lower taxτ , the difference in (5) must thus be positive; this implies Theorem 1.
Although total match utility in wage markets increases as the tax is reduced, individual utility may be non-monotonic. For example, pursuant to a tax decrease, a manager may be made worse off because his match partner is now able to receive more from an alternative manger and switches to that manager. Even if a given manager's match is unchanged, his total utility may decrease because he is forced to increase his transfer to compensate for an increased offer from a competitor.
Individual managers' match utilities may decrease with a decrease in the tax rate, but the sum of workers' match utilities must decrease.
Proposition 2. In a wage market with proportional taxation, if anμ is stable under tax τ , andμ is stable under taxτ <τ , then workers' aggregate match utility must be (weakly) higher underμ than underμ. That is, Note that Proposition 2 does not imply that lower taxes necessarily make workers worse off: workers might receive higher transfers to compensate for their lower match utilities.
Finally, we show that if two distinct matchingsμ andμ are both stable under tax τ , then either managers and workers must disagree as to which matching is preferred, or both groups must be indifferent between the two matchings. This is a consequence of the following more general result. 
Thus, if the managers are not indifferent betweenμ andμ, then the only tax rate τ under which bothμ andμ can be stable is
For τ as defined in (7) to be less than 1, the fraction in (7) must be negative, so that that managers and workers in aggregate disagree about which matching they prefer.
In order for there to be multiple values of τ at which a given two matchings are both stable, it must be that both managers and (following (6)) workers are indifferent between those two matchings.
Corollary 1. In a wage market with proportional taxation, if there is more than one tax under which two distinct matchingsμ andμ both are stable, then M(μ) = M(μ).
Corollary 1 implies that for generic match utilities, there is at most one value of τ at which two matchingsμ andμ are both stable; in this case, since there are finitely many matchings, there is a unique stable matching under almost every tax τ .
Flat Taxation
While not typically phrased in the exact language of taxation, flat taxes are present throughout labor markets. They might take the form of costs for hiring (e.g., employee health care costs) or for entering employment (e.g., licensing requirements). In the marriage market context, flat taxes arise in settings such as online matching services that charge a fee to put participants in contact with each other.
Flat Taxation of Transfers
We first consider a flat tax that is levied only on (nonzero) transfers between match partners.
12 Such a flat tax on transfers, f , corresponds to the transfer function
Figure 3 shows this transfer function. Under this tax structure, the case f = 0 corresponds to the standard (Shapley and Shubik (1971) ) model of matching with transfers and the case f = ∞ corresponds to (Gale and Shapley (1962) ) matching without transfers. We say that 
(·).
A flat tax on transfers has an extensive margin effect that makes being unmatched more attractive relative to matching with a transfer. In non-wage markets, 13 a flat tax on transfers can also encourage matchings in which transfers are unnecessary.
14 As our next example illustrates, this second distortion can cause the total match utility of stable matchings to be non-monotonic in the size of the flat tax.
Example 2. Consider a one-to-one market with two managers-M = {m 1 , m 2 }-three workers-W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }-and match utilities as pictured in Figure 4a . Worker w 1 likes m 1 -who has a slight preference for w 2 -but w 2 strongly prefers m 2 . Manager m 2 , meanwhile, has a strong preference for w 3 , who slightly dislikes him. When transfers are not allowed (or when there is a high flat tax on transfers, f ≥ 195), the only stable matching is the matching µ 1 in which µ 1 (m 1 ) = w 1 and µ 1 (m 2 ) = w 2 , as shown in Figure 4b . This matching yields total match utility of M(µ 1 ) = 360.
When the the flat tax is lowered to f = 185, only the matching µ 2 in which µ 2 (m 1 ) = w 2 and µ 2 (m 2 ) = w 3 is stable; this matching gives a total match utility M(µ 2 ) = 281, as shown in Figure 4c . When f = 185, the tax is low enough that m 2 can convince w 3 to match with him, but not low enough for w 1 to convince to m 1 to stay with her when he has the option of matching with w 2 (which he has once m 2 does not want to match with her). The first change relative to µ 1 (m 2 switching to w 3 ) progresses towards the efficient matching, shown in Figure 4d , but the second change relative to µ 1 (m 1 switching to w 2 ) does not. Lowering the flat tax from 200 to 185 decreases total match utility of the stable matching.
13 Since it is difficult to observe transfers in non-wage markets, such as marriage markets, it is somewhat hard to imagine taxing them. Nevertheless, taxing matches could correspond to marriage license fees and taxing transfers could correspond to a flat tax on gifts between spouses.
14 To see this, consider the case of one-to-one matching markets. In such markets, flat taxes on transfers promotes pairings-(m, w)-where the match utility α (1 9 0 , 9 ) t = − 1 8 0
In strictly positive wage markets, all matchings require a transfer, so a flat tax on transfers does not distort agents' preferences among match partners-for a given transfer vector, if a worker prefers manager m 1 to m 2 without a tax, she also prefers m 1 to m 2 under a flat tax. Thus, in strictly positive wage markets, the matching distortion of the flat tax is only on the extensive margin-the decision of whether to match-under a higher flat tax, fewer agents find matching desirable. This intuition is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In strictly positive wage markets, reduction in a flat tax on transfers (weakly) increases the number of workers matched in stable matchings. That is, if matchingμ is stable under flat taxf , matchingμ is stable under flat taxf , andf <f , then
where #(µ) denotes the number of workers matched in matching µ.
In non-wage markets, the conclusion of Lemma 2 is not true, in general, because distortion among match partners can dominate the extensive margin effect.
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Since flat taxes do not distort among match partners in strictly positive wage markets, in such markets they can only reduce the efficiency of stable matchings by reducing the number of workers matched. This observation, when combined with Lemma 2, gives the following result.
Theorem 2. In strictly positive wage markets, a reduction in a flat tax on transfers (weakly) increases the total match utility of stable matchings. That is, ifμ is stable under flat taxf , µ is stable under flat taxf , andf <f , then
Theorem 2 indicates that in strictly positive wage markets, match utility increases monotonically as flat taxation decreases. We can also bound the total match utility loss from a given flat tax.
Proposition 4. In a strictly positive wage market, letμ be an efficient matching, and letμ be stable under flat tax on transfersf . Then,
Finally, we can show that, for a fixed limit on the number of workers matched in the presence of a flat tax, stable matchings in strictly positive wage markets must generate the maximal match utility possible.
Proposition 5. In a strictly positive wage market, a matchingμ can be stable under a flat tax on transfers only ifμ
15 To see this in the context of Example 2, consider adding a manager m 3 who receives match utility ε when matched with worker w 3 , and gets negative match utility from all other partners. If w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 respectively receive 0, 0, and ε from matching with m 3 and the flat tax is f ≥ 195, then w 3 will match with m 3 -so that all three workers are matched. When f = 185, meanwhile, the matching is the same as without m 3 -so worker w 1 ends up unmatched.
Proposition 5 shows that a flat tax is an efficient way for a market designer to limit the number of matches (in strictly positive wage markets), since matchings stable under flat taxation have maximal utility, given the tax's implied limit on the number of agents matched. Analogously, if a market designer wants to encourage matches, a flat subsidy will maximize total match utility, given the tax-induced lower bound on the number of agents matched. This suggests that if a government wants to use tuition subsidies to encourage people to go to school, then uniform tuition subsidies are more efficient than subsidies proportional to the cost of tuition.
Flat Taxation of Matches
Some fee structures tax all pairings, rather than just those that include nonzero transfers. Such flat fees for matching can also be interpreted in the language of taxation: they correspond to the transfer function 
Unlike flat taxes on transfers, flat fees for matching never distort among match partnerseven in non-wage markets. They only have extensive margin effects, and thus markets with flat fees for matching behave similarly to strictly positive wage markets with flat taxes on transfers.
16 As we show in the Appendix, the conclusions of Lemma 2, Theorem 2, and Propositions 4 and 5 always hold in markets with flat fees for matching.
Discussion
Before concluding, we briefly remark on some structure that is common to both models of taxation.
The Effect of Very Small Taxes
Unlike in non-matching models of taxation, in our setting there is always a non-zero tax that does not generate matching distortions. To see this in the proportional tax setting, letμ be an efficient matching. Our results show that ifμ is stable underτ then
For any inefficient matchingμ, there is a strictly positive minimum tax τ (μ) at whichμ could possibly be stable. Since there are a finite number of possible matchings, we can just take the minimum of this threshold across inefficient matchings,
For τ < τ * only an efficient matching can be stable. 18 The argument for the case of flat taxation is similar.
Structure of the Set of Stable Arrangements
Results of Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) imply that for any fixed τ , or f , if there are multiple stable arrangements, then workers' and managers' interests are opposed. If all managers prefer [µ; t] to [μ;t], then all workers prefer [μ;t] to [µ; t]. Moreover, there exists a manager optimal (worker pessimal) stable arrangement which the managers weakly prefer to all other stable arrangements and a worker optimal (manager pessimal) stable arrangement which the managers weakly prefer. In wage markets with proportional taxation, where there is generically one stable matching, this implies that generically the opposition of interests carries over to the set of supporting transfer vectors.
Conclusion
We analyze the matching distorition that arises taxes on transfers affect the matching of workers to managers. This matching distortion is not necessarily monotonic in the tax level. In wage markets, however, matching distortions always decrease as taxes are reduced. The matching distortion we identify affects the "allocative margin" and is distinct from distortions on the intensive or extensive margins.
A natural extension would examine the interaction of allocative and intensive margin effects in a model that allows for non-binary labor supply decisions. It would also be valuable to analyze how the magnitude of the matching distortion depends on the variance and heterogeneity of agents' preferences. Such work might inform the estimation of the losses due to matching distortions in real-world labor markets.
Proof of Lemma 1
We let B be the set of managers who are matched at µ and let B be the set of workers who are matched at µ. This means that
These observations, combined with the fact that t m→m = t w→w = 0, enable us to show that
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that the outcomes stable under full taxation (τ = 1) cannot Pareto dominate those stable under taxτ < 1. 
with strict inequality for some m or w. However, stability of [μ;t] under taxτ implies that
Combining (9) and (11) gives
for each m ∈ M , while combining (10) and (12) gives
for each w ∈ W . Strict inequality must hold in (13) or (14) for some m or w.
In the first of these cases, we havet m →μ(m ) > 0 for some m ∈ M ; hence, there exists at least one w ∈μ(m ) for whom
But (15) contradicts (14).
In the second case, we have
for some w ∈ W . If we take m =μ(w ), then (16) and (14) 
with strict inequality for some m or w. However, stability of [μ;t] underξ(·) implies that
where the second inequality in (20) follows from the fact thatξ(·) ≥ξ(·).
Combining (17) and (19) givest
hence, the stability conditions for the workers imply that so that we may calculate the lowest tax under which a given inefficient matchμ can be stable. Combining (25) and (33), we find that
The inequality in (36) allows us to rearrange (37) to obtain
so that we findτ
each w ∈ W , which implies equality in (42) and (43), for each w ∈ W . Combining these equalities, and summing across workers w ∈ W , shows that
If the managers are not indifferent in aggregate betweenμ andμ, so that
we have,
.
This shows Proposition 3. To see Corollary 1, it suffices to observe that (47) pins down a unique tax rate in the case that (46) holds. Thus, if there are two tax rates under which matchingsμ andμ are both stable, then we must have 
Proof of Lemma 2
In a strictly positive wage market, all matches are accompanied by a strictly positive transfer; hence, a flat tax on transfers is equivalent to a flat fee for matching. Thus, Lemma 2 follows from the following slightly more general result.
Here and hereafter, we say that an arrangement or matching is stable under flat fee f if it is stable given transfer function ξ match f (·).
Lemma 2'. Reduction of a flat fee for matching (weakly) increases the number of workers matched in stable matchings. That is, if matchingμ is stable under flat feef , matchingμ is stable under flat feef , andf <f , then
where #(µ) denotes the number of workers matched in matching µ. Thus, iff >f , we have #(μ) ≥ #(μ); this proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 2
As in the proof of Lemma 2, Theorem 2 follows from the following slightly more general result.
Theorem 2'. A reduction in a flat fee for matching (weakly) increases the total match utility of stable matchings. That is, ifμ is stable under flat feef ,μ is stable under flat feef , and f <f , then M(μ) ≥ M(μ).
Proof. Using (51) and Lemma 5, we find that 
Proof of Proposition 4
As in the proof of Lemma 2, Proposition 4 follows from the following slightly more general result.
Proposition 4'. Letμ be an efficient matching, and letμ be stable under flat feef . Then,
Proof. This is immediate from (50).
Proof of Proposition 5
As in the proof of Lemma 2, Proposition 5 follows from the following slightly more general result.
Proposition 5'. A matchingμ can be stable under a flat fee only if µ ∈ arg max {µ : #(µ)≤#(μ)} {M(µ)} .
Proof. From (50), we see that if [μ;t] is stable under flat taxf , then for any matchingμ =μ,
If fewer workers are matched inμ than inμ (i.e. #(μ) ≥ #(μ)), (53) implies that M(μ) − M(μ) ≥f · (#(μ) − #(μ)) ≥ 0, so thatμ must have higher total match utility thanμ.
